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Abstract
In this paper we analyse a technique designed to transform any discrete log-
arithm based cryptosystem into an identity-based cryptosystem. The trans-
formation method is claimed to be efficient and secure and to eliminate the
need to invent new identity-based cryptosystems. However, we show that the
identity-based cryptosystem created by the proposed transformation method
suffers from a number of security and efficiency problems.
1 Introduction
In [1], Lee and Liao propose a transformation technique which is claimed to be
able to transform any discrete logarithm based cryptosystem into an identity-
based cryptosystem without modifying the original discrete logarithm based
cryptosystem. They also claim that the identity-based cryptosystem created
by the proposed transformation scheme (referred to here as the transformed
ID-based system) retains all the advantages of identity-based cryptosystems.
However, we show that the transformed ID-based system loses some of the
advantages of general identity-based cryptosystems. Moreover, the transfor-
mation technique suffers from a number of security and efficiency problems.
The reminder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we
review the transformation method. In Section 3, we describe certain security
security and efficiency problems. In Section 4, brief conclusions are provided.
2 Review of the transformation scheme
The proposed transformation technique consists of two stages: the System
setup stage and the Key generation stage. A trusted center (TC) is needed
to generate the system parameters and the private keys for each registered
entity.
The two stages of the transformation process pre-suppose the existence of
a public key cryptosystem based on logarithms to the base g modulo p, where
p is a large prime, q is a large prime dividing p− 1, and g has multiplicative
order q modulo p. That is, we assume that key pairs in this cryptosystem
are of the form (s, gs mod p), where s (the private key) is a random value
satisfying 0 < s < q. The transformation process enables each user of the
system to be provided with a key pair for this public key cryptosystem,
where every user’s public key is based on his identity. Note that every user
of the transformed system should check that a claimed identity possesses the
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appropriate format (see below) before using it to generate a public key —
incorrect identity strings should be rejected.
The scheme works as follows.
1. System setup stage
(a) The TC chooses a threshold value t, where t < logq2 and it is as-
sumed that no group of t or more entities in the system will collude
to attack the system. The security parameter t also determines
the minimum bit-length of each entity’s identity number.
(b) The TC chooses a private key x (0 < x < q); y = gx mod p is the
corresponding public key which is published by the TC.
(c) Let {k1, k2, k3, · · · , kt} be secret information randomly chosen by
TC, where
∑t
i=1 ki < q and
∑j−1
i=1 ki < kj, for every j (1 < j ≤ t).
TC publishes the corresponding public information {K1, K2, K3,
· · ·, Kt}, where Ki = gki mod p, for i = 1, 2, · · ·, t.
(d) Each entity A has a unique t-bit identity IDA = (IDA1, IDA2, · · ·,
IDAt), where IDAi ∈ {0, 1}, for i = 1, 2, · · ·, t. Each identity
is assumed to adhere to pre-specified formatting rules, although
examples of such rules are not given in [1].
2. Key generation stage
Suppose user A wants to join the system. The TC and A carry out the
following procedure to generate A’s private key.
(a) A sends TC his identity IDA = (IDA1, IDA2, · · ·, IDAt).
(b) The TC checks whether the identity IDA conforms to the specified
format. If so, then TC uses his secret information to compute
kA =
∑t
i=1 kiIDAi mod q (note that this corrects a typographical
error in [1]), and σA = x+KAkA mod q, where KA =
∏t
i=1K
IDAi
i
mod p.
(c) TC secretly sends σA to A as A’s private key.
(d) User A checks whether the following equation holds, gσA = yKKAA
mod p, where KA =
∏t
i=1K
IDAi
i mod p.
(e) If the checks succeed then A accepts (σA, YA = g
σA) as his pri-
vate/public key key pair, where YA = yK
KA
A mod q can be com-
puted from a combination of A’s identity and publicly available
information (i.e. y and {K1, K2, · · ·, Kt}).
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3 Comments on the proposed scheme
Lee and Liao [1] claim that their transformation scheme achieves both ef-
ficiency and security. However, we now show that both the security and
efficiency of the transformed ID-based system are open to question.
1. The requirement for the values ki to be super-increasing (specified in
section 3 of [1]) is very dangerous and severely weakens the scheme.
This is because it drastically reduces the possible ranges of these private
values. To see why this is true, suppose that q has 160 bits (as per the
discussion in section 2.1 of [1]), and hence t < 160. Suppose, moreover,
that t is chosen to equal 159, the largest possible value, in order to
maximise the number of possible users in the scheme.
By the super-increasing requirement, we know that k1 < k2, k1 + k2 <
k3, k1 + k2 + k3 < k4, and so on. Hence k2 ≥ k1 + 1, k3 ≥ 2k1 + 2,
k4 ≥ 4k1+4, · · ·, k159 ≥ 2157k1+2157. But we also know that k1+ k2+
· · · + k159 < q < 2160, i.e. 2158(k1 + 1) < 2160, i.e. k1 < 3. Hence k1
can immediately be determined, given that K1 is public! Finding other
values of ki (for small values of i) is then almost as simple.
This implies that choosing the values of ki to be super-increasing is ex-
tremely risky. In fact, this requirement was only imposed, as explained
in section 3 of [1], to avoid the possibility that two users, with differ-
ent identity vectors, share the same key pair. However, as long as t is
sufficiently large, the probability of this happening is very small, and
can therefore be safely ignored. Thus as long as t is at least 120, say,
the requirement for super-increasing values of ki can, and should, be
dropped.
2. Recall that, in the key generation stage of the transform scheme, a
user A’s secret σA ia computed as σA = x + KAkA mod q = x +
KA
∑t
i=1 kiIDAi mod q, where KA is a public value. It is easy to prove
that any n (n < t) users can collude to compute the private key x of
the TC if their identity vectors are linearly dependent in GF (q). From
the discussion in section 3 of [1], this would appear to be the reason
why t-bit identity vectors are required to conform to a special format,
i.e. to prevent a set of users deliberately choosing their identity vectors
to be linearly dependent. Curiously, this special format is not specified
in [1], and needs to be carefully chosen to prevent attacks based on
linear dependencies.
The probability of a randomly chosen set of up to t identity vectors
being linearly dependent over GF (q) is very small, given that q is very
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large. However, this probability could be made much larger if users
were permitted to choose their identity vectors, e.g. to have very small
weight. One possible approach to defining a special format would sim-
ply be to use a 160-bit hash function (see e.g. [2]) to convert identifiers
to 160-bit vectors, thereby preventing malicious users choosing identi-
fiers with special properties. Identity collisions would be prevented by
probabilistic arguments.
3. The transformed ID-based system possesses efficiency problems, includ-
ing the following.
(a) In the transformed ID-based system, a user cannot freely choose
his name and network address as his identity. Identities must be
generated according to a certain format.
(b) In the transformed ID-based system, each user either stores y and
{K1, K2, K3, · · · , Kt} or obtains them from a public directory in
order to compute the public key for another user. The storage
and communication complexity of public key discovery is thus in
proportion to the number of users in the system.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have analysed a protocol which is designed to transform any
discrete logarithm based cryptosystem into an identity-based cryptosystem.
We show that the transformed ID-based system loses some of the advantages
of a general identity-based system and also suffers from security and efficiency
issues.
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